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Abstract 
We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore the willingness to pay to improve the accuracy of prop-
erty assessment and issues regarding attitudes toward these assessments and taxes. We explore individ-
ual willingness to pay to improve property assessment accuracy; the extent to which the willingness to 
pay to improve the accuracy of property assessments depends on whether the risk for other property 
owners decreases; and fnally, we use the results to estimate demand for reduced risk and fnd that 
subjects were not willing to pay to reduce the assessment variance to a level consistent with best prac-
tices in property tax assessment. 
Keywords: Property Tax Assessment, experiment. 
JEL Cassifcation: H7, C91. 
1. Introduction 
One of the perennial diffculties with the property tax is accurately determining the mar-
ket value of taxable property, i. e., the assessment. A common refrain among taxpayers is 
**** We benefted from the very competent research assistance provided by Alicia Plemmons. We also thank Kevin
Ackaramongkolrotn for his assistance in conducting the experiments and the Dan Sweat Chair for fnancial assistance. 
**** ORCID ID: 0000-0001-7980-1705. 
**** ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3020-6267. 
**** ORCID ID: 0000-0002-7227-0718. 














that the property tax is unfair, due in part to the lack of uniformity of property assessments 
among neighbors and over time1. Please note that in the paper we use the terms assessment 
quality, uniformity of assessment, accuracy of assessment, the variance of assessment, and 
assessment risk interchangeably. (See Exhibit A for an explanation of how the property tax 
works in the United States). 
Non-uniform assessments may leave taxpayers feeling cheated and treated unfairly; and,
in addition, appealing an assessment can be a time consuming and risky proposition. Are tax-
payers willing to reduce the risk associated with the uncertainty of their property tax bill by
paying for more accurate assessments? Currently we do not know what, if anything, taxpay-
ers are willing to pay for improved uniformity. As Sjoquist and Walker (1999) demonstrate,
additional expenditures on property assessment can increase the accuracy of the assessment,
measured in that case by the coeffcient of dispersion of sales-assessment ratios. However, as
far as we can determine, no one has attempted to measure the willingness to pay for improved
property tax assessment accuracy, whether through a survey of homeowners, an empirical
model, or a laboratory experiment. Such information is necessary to determine the optimal
quality of assessments, i. e., the quality at which the marginal beneft equals the marginal cost.
In this paper we report on a laboratory experiment that investigates whether subjects are 
willing to pay for more accurate assessments. In our experiment the subjects do not encounter 
any of the terms listed in the frst paragraph. The reduction in the range reduces the variance 
of the possible assessments they might face, i. e., it reduces the assessment risk. We test 
whether the subjects will pay more for reduced property assessment risk than for a reduction 
in risk that does not involve property taxes. We also explore whether the amount that subjects 
are willing to pay for more accurate assessment differs if the decision is made collectively. 
The experiment is the frst and initial attempt to measure the willingness to pay for increased 
quality of property tax assessment. If, as we fnd, the willingness to pay for reduced assess-
ment risk does not differ from the willingness to pay for reducing other risks, then one can 
apply more general measures of willingness to pay to reduce the risk of fnancial loss to the 
decision regarding optimal property tax assessment quality. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the development of
our hypotheses, while in the third section we present details of our experiment. The results of the
experiment are presented in Section 4. A summary and conclusion section completes the paper. 
2. Development of Experimental Hypotheses 
There is a substantial literature that provides estimates of the willingness to pay to avoid 
risk; see for example, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) and Telser and Zweifel (2002) for em-
pirical studies, and Holt and Laury (2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011) for surveys of the sub-
stantial literature concerning experiments associated with risk taking. This existing literature 
fnds that generally individuals are risk averse. In the context of our experiment, we therefore 
expect that individuals would be willing to pay to reduce the risk associated with their prop-
erty tax bill. One way to decrease this risk is through higher quality assessments2. 
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Paying for higher quality property tax assessment, i. e., for a smaller variance in the 
possible assessments, might be considered a form of insurance, although not insurance in 
the conventional sense. Insurance typically refers to a method for reducing or eliminating 
the risk of a large loss, for example, the loss of one’s home. In that setting, insurance reduces 
the expected loss. In our setting, paying for higher quality property tax assessment reduces 
the variance of the possible property tax payments but does not reduce the expected value 
of the property tax payment. Ignoring an insurance company’s transaction costs, the insur-
ance premium equals the expected loss being insured. In our setting, the expected property 
tax payment does not change, so the payment for higher quality assessment is a payment to 
reduce just the variance of the property tax payment. 
Property tax risk refers to the uncertainty a taxpayer has regarding the assessed value of 
the property, and thus of the property tax liability. But there are other possible costs associ-
ated with the property tax. There is the possible mental/emotional cost with paying a tax, a 
cost that has been explored in the tax aversion literature3. The property tax might also violate 
an individual’s norms of social equity; “am I paying more (or less) than my neighbor?”4. 
We hypothesize that these additional costs will increase an individual’s willing to pay more 
to reduce the property tax risk, and thus that the individual will be willing to pay more to 
reduce property tax assessment risk than to reduce a more private risk not associated with 
property taxes. We explore the willingness to pay for higher quality property tax assess-
ment (as measured by a reduction of the variance of the assessment) relative to reducing an 
equivalent risk in a non-property tax setting. We also explore how the willingness to pay for 
increased assessment quality varies with the institutional setting. To do this we conduct a lab 
experiment in which we consider four scenarios, which we briefy describe here, but explain 
in detail below. We consider a scenario in which the subject pays to reduce a non-property 
tax risk (Scenario A), scenarios in which the individual pays to reduce a property tax risk, 
paying either a private frm (Scenario B) or the government (Scenario C), and a scenario in 
which the government payment to reduce property tax risk is determined by a voting mecha-
nism (Scenario D)5. Our experiment is unique in that it involves the interaction of individual 
choices under risk within the context of taxation and public service provision, as well as a 
public mechanism for providing this service.
 Based on the evidence in the tax aversion literature, we hypothesize that subjects will 
be willing to pay more for a reduction in the risk associated with property tax assessment 
than for risk associated with a non-property tax risk. We also hypothesize that subjects will 
pay less for reduced property tax risk if the payment goes to the government than to a private 
frm. Finally, due to potential inequity aversion, we hypothesize that subjects are willing to 
pay more when the decision is made by a median voting mechanism. 
There are some limitations to our experiment. The experiment implicitly assumes that 
the subject-homeowner is concerned only with the current year’s assessment. Suppose how-
ever that the homeowner believes that the distribution of assessments is uniformly distributed 
around the owner’s perceived value of the home, and that the assessment in year t + 1 is inde-
pendent of the assessment in year t. In this case the homeowner will expect to pay, on average 
over time, the property taxes based on his perceived value. In this case, the homeowner may 
 





only be concerned with the swings in assessed value from year to year. Our experiment, how-
ever, concerns decision in one year, and thus one-time property tax payments. 
The experiment doesn’t fully match actual decisions that a taxpayer would make outside 
the lab. The structure of our experiment assumes that in Scenario B the subject must decide 
how much to pay prior to learning what his assessment is. That setting seems appropriate in 
Scenario C, i. e., one would pay the government to do a better job of assessing in general. But 
a taxpayer would normally pay a private vendor to appeal the assessment only after the tax-
payer learned of the value of the assessment, and most likely only if he believed the assess-
ment was too high. Our experiment does test whether or not the taxpayer considers improved 
assessment worthy of additional cost as a starting point. It would be of interest to conduct 
an experiment involving appeals of an assessment, particularly an experiment in which the 
subject had different information regarding his property value and that of his neighbors. 
Finally, there is the obvious concern that our subjects are students and thus may not be 
familiar with property taxes. However, subjects do not need to understand how the property 
tax works to understand the consequences of variations in assessments. But if taxpayer irri-
tation with property taxes comes from having paid them in the past, then our subjects will 
not have developed that attitude. Some of our subjects do own or have owned a home and 
thus have paid property taxes. We fnd no difference in responses between homeowners and 
the other subjects (ranked-sum p=0.121). Furthermore, students do pay other taxes, and thus 
they could have an aversion to taxes to the extent the general public has an aversion to taxes. 
3. Design of the Experiment 
The experiment involves subjects making a series of decisions6. In each decision, they 
are presented with an endowment of $4,500, a set of possible losses that are labeled differ-
ently in Scenario A and the other three scenarios, and the opportunity to make a costly choice 
that can infuence the set of possible losses. The units used are experimental dollars, and all 
conversions to actual earnings are shown to subjects while they are making their decisions. 
In each case, the original set of possible losses includes some mean loss, and then sym-
metrical increases and decreases from the mean loss at 10 fxed intervals in each direction. 
For example, in one case, the mean might be $3,000, and the interval might be $100, so that 
possible outcomes include ($2000, $2100, ... , $2900, $3000, $3100, ... , $4000). These twen-
ty-one outcomes are equiprobable. The mean and the intervals change from round to round, 
but the original set always includes 21 possible outcomes. Note that these are all losses7. 
We introduce four treatments (Scenarios A-D). In each case, subjects are presented with 
an opportunity to make a choice to reduce the set of possible losses. The nature of the choices 
in Scenarios A, B, and C are equivalent, although the labeling differs. In these three scenarios, 
subjects can pay to reduce the set of possible losses by removing the most expensive and least 
expensive losses. For ease of exposition, we refer to this payment as the price. If they pay this 
price once, they remove the two outlying outcomes, which decreases the range of possible 
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outcomes and increases the probability of realizing each remaining outcome. In any round 
they can choose to incur multiples of this price if they prefer, reducing the range of possible 
outcomes further. The choice subjects face, then, is choosing one of a set of 11 lotteries at 
their respective prices, varying from the original set of 21 possible outcomes to a certain 
outcome of the mean loss. 
Once the subject has chosen how much to reduce the range of possible losses, one of the 
remaining losses is selected by the computer with equal probability. Note that, while the ex-
pected realization does not change (it is always the mean loss), the net realization (inclusive 
of the payment for the reduction in the range of possible outcomes) is decreasing in expec-
tation as the subjects reduce the riskiness of the lottery. Subjects thus face a tradeoff in that 
reducing risk also reduces the net expected payoff. 
An alternative to the decisions made here would have been to allow subjects to choose 
whether to reduce the losses (costs or taxes) at one or both ends of the distribution. While 
perhaps more realistic, such choice options would have required specifying different prices 
for each of the 21 options, signifcantly complicating the experiment and analysis. 
In Scenario D, subjects use a median-voter mechanism to collectively decide on the pay-
ment to incur and the set of possible taxes they will face. Subjects are in groups of 5, and each 
subject chooses his preferred amount of risk reduction to propose given the price of reducing 
risk. The median of the 5 choices is implemented, and all subjects in the group each pay that 
price (they do not split it) and face the same resulting set of possible assessments and taxes. 
Note that the range of possible assessments will be the same for all 5 members of the group, 
but the actual assessments will likely differ since the actual assessment is separately select-
ed at random for each subject. As previously discussed, subjects in this treatment may face 
considerations of their own private risk, attitudes toward taxation, as well as equity concerns. 
Note that equity in this setting refers to horizontal equity and not vertical equity since the 
subject is told that all neighbors have the same value home and same income. 
Because framing is critical in our experiment, in each scenario subjects are informed that 
they are members of a group (owners of homes in a neighborhood). Only in Scenario D does 
the group setting materially affect their outcomes, but to identify the impact of the group 
choice mechanism separately from the group framing, they are framed as being members of 
a group in each scenario. 
The 4 scenarios differ in their framing. The framing of the scenarios is as follows: 
Scenario A.—The subject makes a decision of how much to pay a private frm to take 
steps that will reduce the range of possible damages on the subjects’ hypothetical house. 
The payment and effect of narrowing the potential damages is shown on the screen using the 
mouse to move a slider. 
Scenario B.—The subject chooses how much to pay a private frm to provide the gov-
ernment with additional information about his home, like the interior space, the age of the
 





home, etc. This information will help the government determine the value of the home and
will reduce the range of possible values that might be assigned to the home, and consequent-
ly, will reduce the range of possible property taxes that might be levied. 
Scenario C.—The subject chooses how much to pay as an additional tax to the govern-
ment, which is referred to as the Government Information Tax, to provide the government 
with additional resources to collect more detailed information about his home, like the inte-
rior space, the age of the home, etc.8 This information will help the government determine 
the value of the home and will reduce the range of possible values that might be assigned to 
the home, and consequently, will reduce the range of possible property taxes that might be 
levied9. 
Scenario D.—The subject can propose an amount that he and each of his four “neigh-
bors” pay as an additional tax to the government, which is referred to as the Government 
Information Tax, to provide the government with additional resources to collect information 
about the homes in the neighborhood, like the interior space, the age of the home, etc. This 
information will reduce the range of possible values that might be assigned to each of the 5 
homes in the neighborhood. This also reduces the range of possible property taxes the subject 
and each neighbor would have to pay. 
The differences between scenarios allows us to observe willingness to pay to reduce risk 
and to improve assessment accuracy in such a way that we can identify tax aversion, if it is 
present. The frst two scenarios are decisions regarding risk taking and are designed so that 
a payment has the same effect on risk in both scenarios. As suggested above the willingness 
to pay to avoid a loss may differ if the loss is a property tax. Thus, we run Scenario A to give 
a benchmark for an individual’s willingness to reduce the uncertainty of a private loss. (Sce-
nario A allows us to establish the subjects’ attitudes toward risk in a purely non-government 
setting. Note that our treatment of risk is quite novel in that the subjects do not make choices 
over different outcomes, but rather choose how much to pay to reduce the variance of the 
possible outcome10). Comparing the outcomes of Scenarios A and B allows us to see whether 
there is a greater willingness to pay to reduce property tax risk. 
In Scenarios A and B the payments to reduce the variance are made to a private frm. In 
Scenario C the payment to reduce assessment variance is an individual tax paid to the govern-
ment. Comparing Scenarios B and C allows us to further explore whether the subjects treat a 
tax payment differently than a payment to a private frm. 
Finally, Scenario D allows us to explore whether the willingness to pay to reduce prop-
erty tax risk differs if the payment decision is made collectively. In Scenario D, in choosing 
the amount to pay, the subject should assume, based on the construction of the experiment, 
that the amount chosen will determine the subject’s assessment variance as well as that of 
his neighbors. The subject’s payment does not affect his neighbors’ assessment directly, only 
through the mandatory payment that all neighbors pay and the resulting reduction in assess-
ment variance (i. e., improve accuracy). The cost of reducing the variance of the assessment 
for all subjects equals the number of subjects times the cost of reducing the variance for one 
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subject. Thus, this is not a decision regarding a public good or positive spillover. Rather, it 
concerns a mandated reduction in the assessment variance of all neighbors. If the home-
owner’s utility is not a function of the property tax (or more generally the utility) of others, 
then the decisions in Scenarios C and D should be the same. But, if the subject’s utility is a 
function of both his and his neighbors’ property tax, then the outcomes of Scenarios C and 
D could differ. 
Our experiment involves equity in a way that differs from how equity is typically treated 
in that the subject pays for a reduction in the variance of the property tax and doesn’t know 
ex ante how the property tax payments will differ across individuals. The subject only knows 
that the variance of the taxes will be smaller, and thus the expected differences in the sub-
jects’ taxes will be smaller. 
In each treatment, subjects face 15 such decisions, with 5 sets of 3 parameters (mean 
home value, initial range of possible losses or taxes, and the price of the reduction in uncer-
tainty) that are randomly re-ordered in three sets to check for consistency of choices11. For 
each of the treatments, the price required to reduce the range of damages or taxes was set so 
that a graph of the tradeoff between lower risk (as measured by the variance) and expected 
return (as measured by the mean less the payment) was concave. In this setting a subject 
who is risk neutral or who prefers risk would choose not to pay anything, since that would 
maximize his expected value. For risk averse subjects, this condition theoretically ensures a 
unique interior utility maximizing choice of payment, assuming concave indifference curves. 
The instructions were read to the entire group of subjects and questions were answered 
privately. The experiment is a mixed within-and across-subject design: each subject pool 
participates in two scenarios12. An example decision is presented to the subjects as part of the 
instructions before each treatment begins. Each subject is placed anonymously into a group 
with 4 other subjects, then each subject makes a choice. After each choice, subjects are shown 
the loss that was randomly selected for that round, and then subjects are randomly rearranged 
into a new group with 4 other subjects13. They continue for 15 rounds of the frst scenario 
(which could be A, B, C, or D). New instructions are then reviewed (for one of the two 
scenarios not used in the frst 15 rounds), and again, they make 15 choices, with random re-
grouping after each choice, for a second scenario. In this way, subjects make thirty decisions. 
Subjects do not see anyone else’s choices. At the end of these thirty decisions, one is ran-
domly selected for payment. Note that we do not have an equal number of pairs of scenarios. 
4. Results of the Experiments 
The experiments were run at the Andrew Young School’s Experimental Economics 
Center with 135 student subjects14. Each session was designed to last no more than 90 min-
utes with 15 or 20 subjects per session, including a brief questionnaire at the end15. Earnings 
for the experiments averaged US$32.05, with a minimum of US$15.80 and a maximum of 
US$44.00. We treat individual subjects as the unit of analysis. 
 






PARAMETER SETS USED IN THIS EXPERIMENT 
Price of a tick, i. e., 
Average 
Parameter Mean Minimum Maximum Property range reduction 
Endowment Ticks (S.D.) 
Set home value home value home value tax rate equal to 10 percent 
(n=270)
of initial range 
1 $4,500 $200,000 $100,000 $300,000 1% $20 5.22 (2.32) 
2 $4,500 $50,000 $10,000 $90,000 1% $10 3.21 (2.58) 
3 $4,500 $150,000 $70,000 $230,000 1% $40 3.37 (2.33) 
4 $4,500 $100,000 $40,000 $160,000 1% $35 2.88 (1.93) 
5 $4,500 $75,000 $55,000 $95,000 1% $15 1.98 (2.21) 
 
 













As discussed above, in each round subjects faced a choice: they could reduce the risk in 
a risky proposition by selecting between 0 and 10 fxed increments (“ticks”) of payment to 
incur. Each tick reduces the range of possible outcomes by 10 percent of the initial range, so 
zero ticks implies no reduction in risk and 10 ticks provides a certainty payoff. The number of 
ticks a subject chooses is our outcome variable. We varied a number of things experimentally: 
the scenarios as discussed above, the price of a tick, as well as the risky proposition subjects 
faced. Subjects faced repeated choices over fve fxed sets of parameters, presented in Table 
1 in experimental dollars (100 experimental dollars ($) =US$1). 
These parameters were chosen to allow subjects to reveal a wide range of attitudes to-
ward risk. In parameter set 1, for example, we can see that the expected property tax is 1%
of the expected home value, $200,000, for $2,000 in property tax. This implies an expected
gross payoff for the round of ($4,500 – $2,000), or $2,500 (the endowment of $4,500 minus
property tax, before netting out the price of ticks). This is, however, a risky proposition.
When presented, the possible range of payoffs could fall anywhere from $1,500 (if the
home is assessed at its maximum value) to $3,500 (if the home is assessed at its minimum
value). 
We varied the cost of risk reduction across parameter sets. Column 7 of Table 1 presents
the varying prices of a tick, defned above. In parameter set 1, subjects could guarantee a
certainty outcome of a $200,000 assessment by selecting 10 ticks at a total price paid of $200
(10 ticks x $20 per tick); this would yield net earnings of $2,300 (= $4,500 (endowment)
- $2,000 (property tax) - $200 (payment)). In US dollars, this would be US$23.00 with cer-
tainty. Subjects then can choose any of a series of intermediate lotteries between US$23.00
for sure to a set of 21 equiprobable outcomes between US$15.00 and US$35.00. Similar
logic applies to each parameter set. Each subject faced each parameter set six times across
two scenarios. 
Subjects participated actively throughout, with about a third of choices selecting no price 
paid (33.06%), 6.49% choosing 10 ticks (i. e., for a certain outcome), and the remaining 
60.44% making an interior choice. Of the 135 subjects, 2 subjects chose to pay zero through-
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out the experiment, and 11 (including those 2) chose less than an average of 1 tick per period. 
These results are consistent with the premise that most, but not all, subjects are suffciently 
risk averse that they would pay to reduce the variance of a loss. 
Our top line results are straightforward: we fnd that subject behavior appears broadly 
responsive to incentives, but subjects do not respond to the framing in the scenarios. Our 
results are consistent with the notion that subjects treat uncertainty regarding property as-
sessments the same as they do private sources of uncertain costs (comparing Scenarios A and 
B). A comparison of Scenarios B and C fnds no evidence of expressed tax aversion. Figure 
1 presents within-subject average ticks in a box and whisker plot16. There does not appear 
to be an obvious difference in behavior across scenarios; we explore this more fully below. 
Subjects generally appear to make interior choices. 
Figure 1 
BOX AND WHISKER PLOT OF AVERAGE WITHIN-SUBJECT NUMBER OF
TICKS BY SCENARIO 
Subjects participated in two scenarios in succession and so our frst consideration is 
whether there are order effects. We tested whether subject behavior was different in a giv-
en scenario when it was the frst scenario experienced, or the second. In only one case do 
we fnd even marginally signifcant order effects (Scenario A, Wilcoxon within-subject test 
p=0.069)17. In our regressions (reported below), the order variable had no signifcant effect 
on subject choices. We report results using data pooled across all subject choices, but the 
qualitative results are the same if we restrict ourselves only to frst-scenario data18. 
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Table 2 
MANN-WHITNEY AND WILCOXON TESTS OF EQUALITY OF ACROSS SCENARIOS 





vs. B vs. C vs. D 
 A  65  3.416  0.270  0.923
(0.247) 
 B  70  3.062  0.223
(0.230) 
 C  65  3.570  0.604
(0.260) 
 D  70  3.301
(0.224) 
Panel II. Within Subjects 
Scenarios Pairs N 
Differences in ticks 
P-value 
Positive Negative Tie 
A vs. B 35 25 19 1 0.010 
A vs. C 15 26 17 2 0.319 
B vs. C 15 26 19 9 0.910 













Because subjects participated in multiple scenarios, we can conduct within-subject tests 
as well as across-subject tests. We compare the average number of ticks chosen within a sce-
nario with the average number of ticks selected in a different scenario. Because all other var-
iables are unchanged across scenarios, we can isolate the relative effects of scenarios, if any. 
To examine our hypotheses, we compare the within-subject average number of ticks across 
different scenarios using Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon nonparametric tests as appropriate. 
The results are presented in Table 2. 
Note: Because our primary hypotheses involve Scenarios A vs. B and Scenarios C vs. D, we have larger samples 
of subjects facing these scenarios to increase the power of the associated within-sample tests. We are testing the 
difference in ticks between pairs of scenarios. 
We frst consider tests for evidence of differences in willingness to pay across scenar-
ios; i. e., testing whether the willingness to pay differs for a reduction in the property tax
assessment risk and the non-tax risk. We fnd no evidence of difference in willingness to pay
using the across-subjects specifcation (Panel I of Table 2) or the within-subject specifcation
(Panel II of Table 2). In Panel I, the across-subject specifcation, there are no statistically
signifcant differences in subject responses across scenarios. In Panel II, the within-subject
specifcation, we see that subjects did not pay a statistically signifcant larger amount in
Scenarios B and C as compared to Scenario A, or between Scenarios B and C. In the one
case in which there is a signifcant difference in the number of ticks (Scenarios A and B), it
is the case that more subjects chose more ticks in the non-tax scenario (Scenario A) than the
tax scenario (Scenario B) –that is, they paid more to reduce the private loss than they did to
avoid the property tax. 
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Subjects do not appear to behave differently when their choices affect themselves and 
their neighbors (Scenario C vs. D). None of the differences between Scenario C and Scenario 
D is statistically signifcant in either Panel I or II in Table 2. 
The above tests may fail to capture an effect due to the variation induced by the changing 
parameters. To isolate the effects of the parameters and the scenarios separately, we use a 
fxed-effects regression model (equation 1)19: 
In the above model, xit is the number of ticks chosen by subject i in decision round t, αi is
an individual fxed effect, and uit is a decision-round and individual-specifc error term. We in-
clude sets of dummy variables for the scenarios as well as for the treatment. Alternatively, we
can include the varying parameters separately rather than as dummy variables (equation 2): 
(2) 
In this model, we capture not only differences between the parameter sets, but also the 
sources of those differences. The estimated parameters for these models are presented in 
Table 320. 
Table 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS: # OF TICKS, ESTIMATED WITH
SUBJECT-LEVEL FIXED EFFECTS 
 





Observations 4050 4050 
N 135 135 
Overall R2 0.111 0.111 
Tests of Coeffcient Differences 





















Robust standard errors clustered on subject in parentheses; ***: p<0.01. 
We fnd that individuals are generally willing to pay to improve the accuracy of property 
tax assessments, but that they are not willing to pay more to reduce uncertainty of property 
assessments than they would for an analogous private source of uncertainty. In the bottom 
panel of Table 3, we report tests of equality of the coeffcients on dScenario, the scenario dum-
my variables using our frst regression specifcation (both models yield the same qualitative 
results). In only one case was the difference between coeffcients statistically signifcant: 
Scenario B vs. C. The direction here implies that subjects pay more to reduce the variance of 
a loss when that payment goes to a tax than when it goes to a private frm.  
Taken with our other test results, the evidence implies that individuals do not treat prop-
erty assessments differently than other sources of uncertain costs. Our subjects prefer to pay 
for neither, however: in each round, anywhere between 10.37% and 58.15% of subjects chose 
zero ticks. These percentages are negatively correlated with the range of the possible losses 
or taxes for the round (r=–0.959). Subjects did not make any payment if the initial risk was 
small. In addition, our regression results above show that the number of ticks chosen is pos-
itively associated with the range of potential losses and negatively associated with the price 
of a tick. 
Given the consistency of subject behavior across scenarios, we can pool subject deci-
sions across scenarios to estimate the demand for reduced variance of the cost, be it damage 
to one’s property or property tax assessments. To identify a demand relationship, we need 
observed data on price-quantity pairs and exogenous variation on price such that we can be 
certain that the observed quantity decisions fall on the demand curve. In this experiment, 
what subjects are purchasing is reduced variance (or risk), which we quantify as “reduced 
range of possible property damage or property tax liability”. This means that we can convert 
their decisions to “dollars of range reduction”. The price variable will then be “the price of a 
dollar of range reduction”. We can reframe their decision as one in which they are presented 
with a price per dollar of range reduction, and they respond with a quantity of dollars of range 
reduction they would like to purchase at the posted price. 
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This allows us to estimate a revealed demand curve for risk reduction. In this section, 
for ease of interpretation, we will convert units to US$. We can establish the relationship be-
tween the price of a US$1 range reduction and the number of US$1 range reductions chosen, 
and using data pooled over all three scenarios we get the demand curve shown in Figure 2. 
In this fgure, each point is an average choice by a particular subject across encounters with 
a particular parameter set. Each subject thus has the average of six of their choices as a point 
at each of the relevant prices. Within our experimental parameters, the price of reducing the 
range of possible costs by US$1 varied from US$0.10 to US$0.375. At the lowest price, the 
average level of range reduction was US$10.44. At the highest price, the average level of 
range reduction was US$0.79. Overall, the estimated demand curve was Q =9.487–21.715P
(robust standard errors are 0.213 for the intercept term and 0.808 for the slope term), and at 
the mean price and quantity, the price elasticity of demand was -1.09521. Therefore, we do 
fnd that subjects respond to price incentives as we would expect and are willing to pay to 
reduce the variance of the cost. 
Figure 2 
REVEALED DEMAND FOR RISK REDUCTION 
Conclusions extended outside of the experimental environment should be made with 
caution for reasons discussed above, but we can nonetheless extrapolate some of these results 
to provide some ballpark estimates of willingness to pay for reduced risk. The minimum and 
maximum an average subject spent on risk reduction was $29.67 (in experimental dollars) 
in parameter set 5 and $134.60 in parameter set 3. This represented 0.66% of endowment to 
2.99% of endowment for the reduction of risk. As a proportion of the property value, these 
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choices ranged from 0.0396% of the mean home value (again in parameter set 5) to 0.1008% 
of the mean home value (in parameter set 4). 
In order to relate the change in the range of assessments to a more meaningful measure 
of property tax assessment quality, we consider the relationship between our measures of 
variability in the experimental setting, and the coeffcient of dispersion (COD) in assessed 
property values. Table 4 presents the value of the COD for the frst parameter set. The Inter-
national Association of Assessing Offcers (IAAO) suggests that for property tax assessments 
of single-family residential properties the acceptable value of the coeffcient of dispersion 
is between 5.0 percent and 15.0 percent22. To get to a COD of less than 15 percent, subjects 
would have had to pay 100 experimental dollars (5 ticks ×$20 per tick). 
Table 4 
COEFFICIENT OF DISPERSION FOR PARAMETER SET 1 







0 100 300 26.19 
1 110 290 23.68 
2 120 280 21.18 
3 130 270 22.00 
4 140 260 16.15 
5 150 250 13.60 
6 160 240 11.11 
7 170 230 8.57 
8 180 220 6.00 
9 190 210 3.33 
10 200 200 0.00 
The average implied COD selected by subjects was 18.92% (standard deviation of 
5.3%). Subjects had a wide range in the COD they implicitly selected, with the frst quartile 
preferred COD being 11.85%, the median at 16.15%, and the third quartile at 22.88%. While 
slightly higher than that recommended by the IAAO, subjects’ choices display a great amount 
of variation and are responsive to prices. 
Finally, given the amount of experimental control available, we take advantage of our 
ability to estimate parameters for commonly used models of risk preferences. By observing 
choices among the set of available lotteries in each round, we can examine subject behavior 
for consistency. First, we convert each choice to an implied level of constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA). We do this as simply as possible. For each choice, there is a minimum and 
maximum value of the coeffcient of relative risk aversion (ρ) that renders that choice prefer-
able to the other available choices. For each choice, we assign the midpoint of the minimum 
and maximum values as their revealed value of ρ for the round23. The mean estimated value 
of ρ was 2.02. Individual subjects’ value of ρ fell within an estimated range of (0.043, 8.948). 




The 95% confdence interval estimate of the mean value of ρ across all subjects and decisions 
in our data was (1.747, 2.673). 
Our results are similar to estimates reported in the literature but are overall inconsistent 
with these commonly used models of risk preference24. Harrison et al. (2006), for example, 
found similar estimates of the coeffcient of relative risk aversion. They also found intertem-
poral stability of risk preference with repeated measures. This is not inconsistent with our 
results, as their subjects participated in many fewer tasks than did ours, and they repeated the 
same task with multiple months between measurements. Table 5 shows the mean values of ρ
for each round as well as p-values from statistical tests of the equality of ρ across parameter 
sets. In most cases, we reject the null that the revealed coeffcient is consistent across param-
eter sets. These variations from period to period are consistent within a given parameter set 
and are statistically signifcantly different across parameter sets. Our results appear to argue 
that the CRRA model does not explain our subjects’ behavior well. In addition, repeating this 




ED CRRA BY PARAMETER SET, 
IMPLIED CRRA ACROSS PA
P-VALUES
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implied ρ Std. Error vs. 3 vs. 4 vs. 5
1 1.467 0.127 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.000 
2 2.046 0.248 0.480 0.857 0.019 
3 1.940 0.150 0.247 0.003 
4 2.145 0.185 0.014 
5 2.667 0.272 
n= 135 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Using a laboratory experiment we explore individual willingness to pay for improve-
ments in the quality of property assessments. In addition, we examine whether individu-
als treat property assessments different from private sources of risk, and whether making a 
choice collectively affects behavior. We consider four scenarios that differ in the framing of 
a cost (property damage versus property taxes) and payment (to a private frm versus to the 
government) to reduce the cost, and in whether the choice affects only the individual or a 
group. 
The amount that an individual is willing to pay to reduce the variance of property taxes 
(i. e., to improve assessment quality to reduce risk) or to reduce the risk of a private cost de-
pends on the price of the improvement and the size of the pre-reduction variance of the cost. 
However, contrary to our expectations, we fnd that individuals treat the risk of private losses 
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and property tax risk the same. Furthermore, we fnd that subjects do not behave differently 
when faced with a choice that affects others as well as themselves. 
Subjects in this experiment are risk-averse in general, with levels of risk aversion consist-
ent with those estimates reported in the literature. Their behavior is not consistent with com-
monly used models of utility across the parameter space we explore within our experiment. 
Behavior is nonetheless consistent with the law of demand, and we estimate the demand for 
improved property tax assessments. We also fnd that subjects are willing to pay to reduce 
the coeffcient of dispersion of property assessments but do not reduce it to a level consistent 
with best practices in property tax assessment. 
Our results argue that treating public sources of risk as different from other risks may 
be unwarranted. This suggests that future research should focus more specifcally on other 
attendant concerns regarding the aversion to property taxes found in surveys. The primary 
motivation of subjects within this study appears to be a desire to effciently and effectively 
reduce risk, and future research can improve on these results by increasing the connection 
between the laboratory and property taxation outside the lab. 
To isolate risky choice and property tax assessment per se, we considered behavior with 
very little social interaction. The existing literature argues that equity concerns may be sig-
nifcant in determining attitudes toward property taxation. Expanding the approach here to 
determine how equity might affect people’s choices would be informative. 
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Exhibit A. The Property Tax in the United States 
In the United States, the property tax is a very important source of revenue for local 
governments, particularly for school districts. Property tax revenue is 72 percent of local 
government taxes and is 36 percent to total revenue for school districts. 
Property tax liability in the United States equals the assessed value of the property, less 
any partial exemptions, times the property tax rate. The assessed value is some percentage of 
the property’s estimated market value. (The percentage is the same in any jurisdiction within 
a state but varies across states.) The government’s tax assessor is responsible for developing 
an estimate of the market value of each property each year, where the market value is defned 
as the price that the property should sell for in an open market between a willing buyer and 
willing seller. 
The assessor relies on the sales prices of recently sold properties that are similar to the 
property under consideration. Many assessors use computer programs that use the charac-
teristic of recently sold properties and the sale price to develop the estimated value of other 
properties. The more information that the assessor has about the characteristics of properties, 
the more likely the estimated value of the property will be the price the property would sell 
for, although that price is unknown until the property sells. 
The assessor is estimating what the property should sell for, but the owner has her own 
idea of what the property could sell for. If she believes the property is worth less than the as-
sessor’s estimated value, she can appeal to a governmental board set up for that purpose and 
make the case for why her estimated value is better than the assessor’s estimate. Other than 
the owner’s out of pocket expense in developing her case, the appeal is free. If the owner is 
not satisfed by the ruling of the board, she can appeal to the court system, although that step 
is time consuming and costly. The ruling of the court is fnal. The tax is paid by the property 
owner to her local revenue administration. 
 Appendix A. Subject Instructions 





Welcome and thank you for participating! 
Before we begin, please turn off and store all of your electronic devices. Thank you. 
This is a study of economic decision making. Your participation is voluntary. You have 
the opportunity to make money in this experiment. The amount of money you can earn today 
will depend on your decisions, so please read carefully. 
Random Group Assignments and Anonymity 
Each person will be randomly matched with 4 other people to form a 5-person group. No 
one will learn the identity of the members of his/her group. After each round, all the groups 
will be rearranged and you will be randomly matched in a new group of 5 people (you and 
4 others). 
Privacy 
As a member of a group you will be completely anonymous. No participant will be able 
to link your choices to your identity. Please do not reveal your identity to anyone. Do not 
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. 
Payment 
Your total payment will consist of a participation fee of $5 and the amount you earn in 
one of the rounds of the experiment. The earnings during the experiment will be in “experi-
mental dollars”, which will be converted to U.S. dollars at the rate displayed on your screen.
You will be paid in U.S. currency privately at the end of the session. 
You will participate in a number of rounds in today’s experiment. In each round you will 
be required to make a decision, and in each round, you will be assigned an INDIVIDUAL 
FUND in which your earnings for the round will be placed. The decision for a given round 
will lead to consequences that change the amount of money in your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
At the end of the experiment one of the rounds will be randomly chosen as the one that deter-
mines your earnings. The experimental dollars in your INDIVIDUAL FUND for that round 
will be converted to U.S. dollars and combined with your participation fee to determine your 
payment. You should think very carefully about each decision as you do not know which 
decision will be chosen for payment. We will discuss the decisions you will be making in a 
moment. 
41 Property Tax Assessment Quality: Willingness-to-Pay for Reduced Risk in a Lab Experiment
 
Time 
Today’s session will consist of the experiment itself and a brief questionnaire. The whole 
session should take no more than 2 hours. 
Final notes 
Please, read all the instructions carefully. You are welcome to ask questions at any point. 
Just raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you in private. Once you have 
fnished reading the instructions please put the instructions face down on your workstation 
and the experiment will continue as soon as everyone is fnished reading the instructions. 
Instructions for the Next Set of Rounds [Scenario A] 
You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
Remember, you will be randomly assigned into new groups of 5 people after each round. 
In each round, you and the other members of your group own homes in a neighborhood. 
Living in that home generates benefts for you, which can be measured in dollars, and which 
will be shown to you on the screen. This amount will be deposited into your INDIVIDUAL 
FUND for the round. 
Unfortunately, within each round, an event will occur that will cause damage to your 
home and you will have to pay to repair those damages. There will be exactly one such event 
in each round. 
For example, the tree in the front yard could fall and do major damage, requiring a very 
costly repair, or a single limb might fall off the tree and do a small amount of damage, re-
quiring little repair. You expect that it will cost some amount of money to repair the damages 
in a given round. The actual cost of repairing the damages can fall anywhere within a range 
of possible values. The range of possible damages for you and your neighbors is identical, 
although the homes look different, and the damages that occur may differ from one home to 
the next. 
In each round, you will be told the range of possible costs necessary to repair damages 
to the home. 
You can pay a frm to take steps that will reduce the range of possible damages for which 
you would have to pay for repairs. For example, before any event, the frm might come out 
to your house and inspect the tree and take steps to ensure that neither it nor a limb will fall, 
reducing the likelihood of a large damage and a small damage. The more you pay that frm, 
the greater the reduction in the range of possible damages –that is, the largest and smallest 
possible damage amounts will be eliminated. This means that the probability of each of the 
remaining possible damages will increase, as the probabilities must add up to one. Each of 
 











Round Number: 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 
Possible Damages (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the range of possible Damages (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenalio, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from your home: 
MINUS 
Services Cost Paid: 
MINUS 
Possible Damages: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $550 and $1,950 
= Between $2,550 and $3,950 
($4,500 - $0 - between $550 and $1,950) 
X 0.01 
= Between $25.50 and $39.50 
175 
Time remaining: 58 seconds 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
Submit Decision 
200 225 250 
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the possible damage amounts is equally likely. Note that you can choose not to spend any-
thing on the frm’s services and accept the larger range in damages. 
The cost of the frm’s services may be different from one round to the next. The cost will 
always be shown to you on the screen.  
At the beginning of each round you will see a range of possible damages and you will see
a “slider” that can be moved to indicate how much you will spend to reduce the range of possi-
ble damages. As you move the slider, you will see that the range of possible damages will de-
crease and the probability of each of the remaining damage amounts will increase. Once you
have decided how much to spend on frm’s services, click on the SUBMIT button. The amount
you paid for the frm’s services, if any, will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
At that point, one of the possible damages will be selected at random by the computer.
There is an equal chance that any of the damages shown on the screen will be selected. The 
amount shown will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
Let’s consider some examples. The two pictures are examples of what you will see on 
the screen. 
The frst picture is an example of the screen you will see at the beginning of the round.
The top box shows the range of possible damages. The slider on the bar in the middle can be
moved to select the amount you want to pay to reduce the range of possible damages. The box
at the bottom summarizes the benefts and costs; the values will change as you move the slider.












Round Number: 1 Time remaining: 40 seconds 
1 1 1 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1.810 1,880 1,950 
Possible Damages (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the range of possible Damages (in $)? 
25 so 75 100 125 ISO 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit frorn your home; 
MINUS 
Services Cost Paid: 
MINUS 
Possible Damages: 
Your Lab Earnings: 
TIMES conversion rate: 
Final earnin gs 
$4,500 
- $75 
- Between $760 and $1,740 
= Between $2,685 and $3,665 
($4,500- $75 - between $760 and $1,740) 
X 0.01 
= Between $26.85 and $36.65 
175 200 225 250 
Submit Oecision 1 
Once you have determined the amount you want to spend to reduce the range of damages and
have set the slider on that amount, clicking the “Submit Decision” box will submit the decision. 
In the second picture, the player has moved the slider to $75. This has reduced the range of
damages to between $760 and $1,740. If the player were to now click the SUBMIT button, one
of the values between $760 and $1,740 would be selected at random, with equal probability.
To sum up: 
— At the start of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 5 people. 
— At the start of each round, your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be set to zero. 
— You own a home in a neighborhood. 
— That home provides you with a beneft, which will be added to your INDIVIDUAL 
FUND. 
— Your home will receive damages. The damages and the cost of repairing these damag-
es may be different from one round to the next. These will be randomly selected from 
a set of damages and associated cost of repair shown on the screen. 
— You can pay a frm to reduce the range of possible damages, or choose not to pay to 
reduce this range. This payment will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
 


















— The cost of the frm’s services may be different from one round to the next. The cost 
will always be shown to you on the screen. 
— Once you have chosen one of the payment options, the damages are randomly select-
ed from the range of possible values and the cost of repairing these damages will be 
subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— At the end of each round, the amount in your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be stored by 
the computer. If this round is the round selected for payment, the amount in your IN-
DIVIDUAL FUND at the end of this round will be combined with your participation 
fee to determine your payment. 
— You do not know which decision will be chosen for payment, so you should think 
carefully about each decision. 
— At the start of the next round your INDIVIDUAL FUND will again be set to zero. 
Instructions for the Next Set of Rounds [Scenario B] 
You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
Remember, you will be randomly assigned into new groups of 5 people after each round. 
In each round, you and the other members of your group own homes in a neighborhood. 
The local government provides public services that offer you benefts, which can be meas-
ured in dollars, and which will be shown to you on the screen. This amount will be deposited 
into your INDIVIDUAL FUND for the round. 
To pay for these services the government must impose taxes on you and your neighbors.
The tax used is a property tax, which works as follows. The government attempts to determine
the value of everyone’s home. However, valuing homes is not an exact science, and the value
that the government sets for your home can fall anywhere within a range of possible values.
The range of possible home values for you and your neighbors is identical, although the homes
look different, and so the values the government assigns may differ from one home to the next. 
In each round, you will be told the range of possible values the government could assign 
to your home for tax purposes. The taxes you pay will be the value of your home as deter-
mined by the government times the tax rate.  
You can pay a private frm, which is known as Property Tax Advisors, to collect more de-
tailed information like the home’s interior space, quality of construction of the home, sales prices
of neighboring homes, etc. This information will be provided to the government. It will help the
government determine the value of your home and will reduce the range of possible values that
might be assigned to your home. This also reduces the range of possible property taxes you would
have to pay. The more you pay Property Tax Advisors, the more information they will collect,













Round Number: 1 
Possible Home Values (in $1,000) 
55 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the rcmge of possible values (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: 
MINUS 
Service Cost Paid: 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $550 and $1,950 
= Between $2,550 and $3,950 
($4,500 - SO- between $550 and Sl,950) 
X 0.01 
= Between $25.50 and $39.50 
175 
_,J_gj.l!J 
Time remaining: 59 seconds 
132 139 146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
1 
Submit Decision 
200 225 250 
and the greater the reduction in the range of possible values the government will set for you home
–that is, the largest and smallest possible values will be eliminated. This then reduces the range
of taxes you might have to pay. This means that the probability of each of the remaining possible
home values will increase, as the probabilities must add up to one. Each of the possible home
values is equally likely. Note that you can choose not to hire Property Tax Advisors (in which
case you would not pay them anything) and accept the larger range in home values and taxes. 
The cost of Property Tax Advisors may be different from one round to the next. The cost 
will always be shown to you on the screen. 
At the beginning of each round, you will see a range of possible assigned home values and
the corresponding taxes you would pay for each home value. You will also see a “slider” that
can be moved to indicate the amount you will spend on Property Tax Advisors to reduce the
range of possible values and associated property taxes. As you move the slider, you will see that
the range of taxes will decrease and the probability of each tax will increase. Once you have de-
cided how much to spend on Property Tax Advisors, click on the SUBMIT button. The amount
you paid to Property Tax Advisors, if any, will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
At that point, one of the possible assigned property values for your home and the associ-
ated property taxes, will be selected at random by the computer. There is an equal chance that 
any of the taxes shown on the screen will be selected. The amount shown will be subtracted 
from your INDIVIDUAL FUND.  
Let’s consider some examples. The two pictures are examples of what you will see on 
the screen. 
 












Round Number: 1 Time remaining: 48 seconds 
Possible Home Values (in $1,000) 
55 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 132 139 146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the range of possible values (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: 
MINUS 
Service Cost Paid: 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $760 and $1,740 
= Between $2,685 and $3,665 
($4,500- $75 - between $760 and $1,740) 
X 0 .01 
= Between $26.85 and $36.65 
Submit Decision 
175 200 225 250 
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The frst picture is an example of the screen you will see at the beginning of the round.
The top box shows the possible assigned home values in dark blue and the possible property 
taxes in light blue. The slider on the bar in the middle can be moved to select the amount you 
want to pay to reduce the range of assigned values. The box at the bottom summarizes the 
benefts and costs; the values will change as you move the slider. Once you have determined 
the amount you want to spend to reduce the range of assigned home values and have set the 
slider on that amount, clicking on the “Submit Decision” box will submit the decision. 
In the second picture, the player has moved the slider to $75. This has reduced the range of
possible taxes to between $760 and $1,740. If the player were to now click the SUBMIT button,
one of the values between $760 and $1,740 would be selected at random, with equal probability. 
To sum up: 
– At the start of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 5 people. 
– At the start of each round, your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be set to zero. 
– You own a home in a neighborhood. 
– The local government provides you with public services, which can be measured as a 
beneft, which will be added to your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
– To provide these services, the local government estimates the value of your property 
and collects property taxes. The assigned value of your property and the resulting taxes













may be different from one round to the next. These will be randomly selected from a 
set of available options shown on the screen. 
– You can pay Property Tax Advisors to reduce the range of possible values (and taxes), 
or choose not to pay to reduce this range. This tax payment will be subtracted from 
your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
– The cost of Property Tax Advisors may be different from one round to the next. The 
cost will always be shown to you on the screen. 
– Once you have chosen the amount to pay Property Tax Advisors, the assigned value of 
your home is randomly selected from the range of possible values and the associated 
property taxes will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
– At the end of each round, the amount in your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be stored by 
the computer. If this round is the round selected for payment, the amount in your IN-
DIVIDUAL FUND at the end of this round will be combined with your participation 
fee to determine your payment. 
– You do not know which decision will be chosen for payment, so you should think 
carefully about each decision. 
– At the start of the next round your INDIVIDUAL FUND will again be set to zero. 
Instructions for the Next Set of Rounds [Scenario C] 
You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
Remember, you will be randomly assigned into new groups of 5 people after each round. 
In each round, you and the other members of your group own homes in a neighborhood. 
The local government provides public services that offer you benefts, which can be meas-
ured in dollars, and which will be shown to you on the screen. This amount will be deposited 
into your INDIVIDUAL FUND for the round. 
To pay for these services the government must impose taxes on you and your neighbors.
The tax used is a property tax, which works as follows. The government attempts to determine
the value of everyone’s home. However, valuing homes is not an exact science, and the value
that the government sets for your home can fall anywhere within a range of possible values.
The range of possible home values for you and your neighbors is identical, although the homes
look different, and so the values the government assigns may differ from one home to the next. 
In each round, you will be told the range of possible values the government could assign 
to your home for tax purposes. The taxes you pay will be the value of your home as deter-
mined by the government times the tax rate. 
 




Round Number: 1 
Possible Home Values (in $1,000) 
55 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the range of possible values (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: 
MINUS 
Government Information Tax Paid: 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $550 and $1,950 
= Between $2,550 and $3,950 
(S'l,500 - SO - between SSSO and Sl,950) 
X 0.01 
= Between $25.50 and $39.50 
175 
..:..[QJ..!!J 
Time remaining: 58 seconds 
1 
132 139 146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
Submit Decision 
200 225 250 
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You can pay an additional tax to the government, which is referred to as the Government 
Information Tax, to provide the government with additional resources to collect more de-
tailed information like the home’s interior space, quality of construction of the home, sales 
prices of neighboring homes, etc. This information will help the government determine the 
value of your home and will reduce the range of possible values that might be assigned to 
your home. This also reduces the range of possible property taxes you would have to pay. The 
larger the Government Information Tax you pay, the more information they will collect, and 
the greater the reduction in the range of possible values the government will set for you home 
–that is, the largest and smallest possible values will be eliminated. This then reduces the 
range of taxes you might have to pay. This means that the probability of each of the remain-
ing possible home values will increase, as the probabilities must add up to one. Each of the 
possible home values is equally likely. Note that you can choose not to pay any Government 
Information Tax and accept the larger range in home values and taxes. 
The cost of the Government Information Tax may be different from one round to the 
next. The cost will always be shown to you on the screen. 
At the beginning of each round, you will see a range of possible assigned home values 
and the corresponding taxes you would pay for each home value. You will also see a “slider” 
that can be moved to indicate the amount you will spend on the Government Information Tax 
to reduce the range of possible values and associated property taxes. As you move the slider, 
you will see that the range of taxes will decrease and the probability of each tax will increase.
Once you have decided how much to spend on the Government Information Tax, click on the 
SUBMIT button. The amount you paid for the Government Information Tax, if any, will be 
subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 








Round Number: 1 Time remaining : 42 seconds 
Possible Home Values (in $1,000) 
55 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 132 139 146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
How much would you like to spend to reduce the range of possible values (in $)? 
Submlt Decision 
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: $4,500 
MINUS 
Government Information Tax Paid: - $75 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: - Between $760 and $1,740 
Your Lab Earnings: = Between $2,685 and $3,665 
($4,500- $75 - between $760 and $1,740) 
TIMES conversion rate: x 0.01 
Final earnings = Between $26.85 and $36.65 
At that point, one of the possible assigned property values for your home and the associ-
ated property taxes, will be selected at random by the computer. There is an equal chance that 
any of the taxes shown on the screen will be selected. The amount shown will be subtracted 
from your INDIVIDUAL FUND.  
Let’s consider some examples. The two pictures are examples of what you will see on 
the screen. 
The frst picture is an example of the screen you will see at the beginning of the round.
The top box shows the possible assigned home values in dark blue and the possible property 
taxes in light blue. The slider on the bar in the middle can be moved to select the amount you 
want to pay to reduce the range of assigned values. The box at the bottom summarizes the 
benefts and costs; the values will change as you move the slider. Once you have determined 
the amount you want to spend to reduce the range of assigned home values and have set the 
slider on that amount, clicking on the “Submit Decision” box will submit the decision. 
In the second picture, the player has moved the slider to $75. This has reduced the range of
possible taxes to between $760 and $1,740. If the player were to now click the SUBMIT button,
one of the values between $760 and $1,740 would be selected at random, with equal probability. 
To sum up: 
— At the start of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 5 people. 
— At the start of each round, your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be set to zero. 
 












— You own a home in a neighborhood. 
— The local government provides you with public services, which can be measured as 
a beneft, which will be added to your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— To provide these services, the local government estimates the value of your property 
and collects property taxes. The assigned value of your property and the resulting 
taxes may be different from one round to the next. These will be randomly selected 
from a set of available options shown on the screen. 
— You can pay a Government Information Tax to reduce the range of possible values 
(and taxes), or choose not to pay to reduce this range. This tax payment will be sub-
tracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— The cost of the Government Information Tax may be different from one round to the 
next. The cost will always be shown to you on the screen. 
— Once you have chosen the Government Information Tax level, the assigned value of 
your home is randomly selected from the range of possible values and the associated 
property taxes will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— At the end of each round, the amount in your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be stored by 
the computer. If this round is the round selected for payment, the amount in your IN-
DIVIDUAL FUND at the end of this round will be combined with your participation 
fee to determine your payment. 
— You do not know which decision will be chosen for payment, so you should think 
carefully about each decision. 
— At the start of the next round your INDIVIDUAL FUND will again be set to zero. 
Instructions for the Next Set of Rounds [Scenario D] 
You will now be randomly assigned by the computer into groups of 5 people. 
Remember, you will be randomly assigned into new groups of 5 people after each round. 
In each round, you and the other members of your group own homes in a neighborhood. 
The local government provides public services that offer you benefts, which can be meas-
ured in dollars, and which will be shown to you on the screen. This amount will be deposited 
into your INDIVIDUAL FUND for the round. 
To pay for these services the government must impose taxes on you and your neighbors. 
The tax used is a property tax, which works as follows. The government attempts to deter-
mine the value of everyone’s home. However, valuing homes is not an exact science, and 





thus the value that the government sets for your property can fall anywhere within a range of 
possible values. The range of possible values for you and your neighbors have is identical, 
although the homes look different, and so the values the government assigns may differ from 
one home to the next. 
In each round, you will be told the range of possible values the government could assign 
to your home for tax purposes. The taxes you pay will be the value of your home as deter-
mined by the government times the tax rate.  
You can propose that you and each of your neighbors pay an additional tax to the gov-
ernment, which is referred to as the Government Information Tax, to provide the government 
with additional resources to collect more detailed information about the homes in the neigh-
borhood like the home’s interior space, quality of construction of the home, sales prices of 
neighboring homes, etc. This information will help the government determine the value of 
the homes and will reduce the range of possible values that might be assigned to each of the 
5 homes in your neighborhood. This also reduces the range of possible property taxes you 
and your neighbors would have to pay. The larger the Government Information Tax you and 
your neighbors pay, the greater the reduction in the range of possible values the government 
will set for the homes in the neighborhood –that is, the largest and smallest possible values 
will be eliminated. This then reduces the range of taxes you and each of your neighbors might 
have to pay. This means that the probability of each of the remaining possible home values 
will increase, as the probabilities must add up to one. Each of the possible home values is 
equally likely. Note that you can propose to have no Government Information Tax for you 
and your neighbors. 
The cost of the Government Information Tax may be different from one round to the 
next. The cost will always be shown to you on the screen. 
Once everyone has submitted their choice for the additional per-group-member tax, the two
highest and two lowest choices will be set aside by the government agency. The remaining choice,
which is the choice that falls in the middle of your group of 5 members, will be the Government
Information Tax paid by EVERY group member as the tax to provide additional information. 
At the beginning of each round, you will see a range of possible assigned home values 
and the corresponding taxes you would pay for each home value. You will also see a “slider” 
that can be moved to indicate the per-group-member amount you would like yourself and 
your neighbors to spend to reduce the range of possible values and associated property taxes.
As you move the slider, you will see that the range of taxes will decrease and the probability 
of each tax will increase. Once you have decided how much you would like you and your 
group members each to spend on the Government Information Tax, click on the SUBMIT 
button. 
Once all group members have clicked SUBMIT, the middle choice of the Government 
Information Tax will be selected, and that amount, if any, will be subtracted from your IN-
DIVIDUAL FUND. 
 





Round Number: 1 
Possibte Home Values (in $1,000) 
SS 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 132 139 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 1,320 1,390 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
What is your choice for the Government Information tax to reduce the range of possible values (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: 
MINUS 
Government Information Tax Paid: 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $550 and $1,950 
= Between $2,550 and $3,950 
(S'l,500 - SO - between SSSO and Sl,950) 
X 0.01 
= Between $25.50 and $39.50 
175 200 
.,Jgj.l!J 
Time remaining: 58 seconds 
1 
146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




If the Government Information Tax that is selected by the group is not the level you 
proposed, the range of possible assigned property values will change to refect the selected 
Government Information Tax. 
At that point, one of the possible assigned property values for your home, and the associ-
ated property taxes, will be selected at random by the computer. There is an equal chance that 
any of the taxes shown on the screen will be selected. The amount shown will be subtracted 
from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
Let’s consider some examples. The two pictures are examples of what you will see on 
the screen. 
The frst picture is an example of the screen you will see at the beginning of the round.
The top box shows the possible assigned home values in dark blue and the possible property 
taxes in light blue. The slider on the bar in the middle can be moved to select the amount 
you want to pay to reduce the range of assigned home values. The box at the bottom sum-
marizes the benefts and costs; the values will change as you move the slider. Once you have 
determined the amount you want to spend and have set the slider on that amount, clicking the 
“Submit Decision” box will submit the decision. 
In the second picture, the player has moved the slider to $75. This represents a proposal 
to reduce the range of taxes to between $760 and $1,740. If the player were to now click the 
SUBMIT button, that choice would be proposed for the group. Once each player has clicked 
SUBMIT, the middle proposal will determine the range of possible assigned home values 









Round Number: 1 Time remaining: 43 seconds 
Possible Home Values (in $1,000) 
55 62 69 76 83 90 97 104 111 118 125 132 139 146 153 160 167 174 181 188 195 
550 620 690 760 830 900 970 1,040 1,110 1,180 1,250 1,320 1,390 1,460 1,530 1,600 1,670 1,740 1,810 1,880 1,950 
Possible property taxes paid (in $) 
What is your choice for the Government Information tax to reduce the range of possible values (in $)? 
25 50 75 100 125 150 
Your payoff in this scenario, if this choice is selected for payment: 
Benefit from public services: 
MINUS 
Govemment Information Tax Paid: 
MINUS 
Property Taxes paid: 
Your Lab Earnings: 




- Between $760 and $1,740 
= Between $2,685 and $3,665 
($4,500- S75 - between $760 and $1,740) 
X 0.01 




(and the associated property taxes) and one of the values in that range would be selected at 
random, with equal probability. 
To sum up: 
— At the start of each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of 5 people. 
— At the start of each round, your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be set to zero. 
— You own a home in a neighborhood. 
— The local government provides you with public services, which can be measured as 
a beneft, which will be added to your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— To provide these services, the local government estimates the value of your home and 
collects property taxes. The assigned value of your property and the resulting taxes 
may be different from one round to the next. These will be randomly selected from a 
set of available options shown on the screen. 
— You and your neighbors can pay a Government Information Tax to reduce the range 
of possible values (and taxes). You can propose the Government Information Tax that 
you would like for you and each of your neighbors to pay. 
— Once everyone has proposed a desired level of the Government Information Tax, the 
level that falls in the middle of the Government Information Tax amounts selected by 
 








the 5 group members will be selected as the actual level that will be imposed. This 
payment will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— The cost of the Government Information Tax may be different from one round to the 
next. The cost will always be shown to you on the screen. 
— Once the Government Information Tax level has been selected, the range of assigned 
values will refect the chosen tax payment.  
— The assigned value of your home is randomly selected and the associated property 
taxes will be subtracted from your INDIVIDUAL FUND. 
— At the end of each round, the amount in your INDIVIDUAL FUND will be stored by 
the computer. If this round is the round selected for payment, the amount in your IN-
DIVIDUAL FUND at the end of this round will be combined with your participation 
fee to determine your payment. 
— You do not know which decision will be chosen for payment, so you should think 
carefully about each decision. 
— At the start of the next round your INDIVIDUAL FUND will again be set to zero. 





















11. See American Enterprise Institute (2015) for public opinion survey of attitude toward taxes. 
12. There are many dimensions of the quality of assessment, including the coeffcient of dispersion, deviation of 
the mean or median sales-assessment ratio from the legal assessment ratio and how the sales-assessment ratio 
varies across property value. The latter is usually measured by the price related differential (PRD), which 
measures the extent to which higher or lower valued properties are over or under assessed on average. 
13. There is increasing empirical evidence of such an effect; see, for example, Hardisty, Johnson and Weber (2010); 
Kirchler (1998); Schmölders (1959); Hill (2010)); McCaffrey and Baron (2004); Löfgren and Nordblom 
(2009); Sussman and Olivola (2011); Kallbekken, Kroll and Cherry (2011); Ackermann, Fochmann and Mihm 
(2013); and Blaufus and Möhlmann (2014). 
14. For a discussion of the complications of social equity, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and Ackert, Martínez-Vázquez and Rider (2007), who conduct an ex-
periment in which subjects made choices between the size of some payoff and equity and fnd a willingness to 
accept a smaller payoff for reduced payoff inequality. 
15. In our experiment subjects know the distribution of outcomes, and thus the experiment is one concerned with 
risk. Nonetheless, we use uncertainty as a synonym for risk. 
16. Subject instructions are available in Appendix A. 
17. The endowment ensures that subjects cannot lose money overall, but the uncertainty is framed as an uncertain 
loss rather than the mathematically equivalent uncertain gain within a particular round. 
18. While in the real world this tax could be part of the property tax, and thus subject to the variance of the assess-
ment, the experiment treats it as a separate and fxed tax payment. Note that the improvement in assessment 
is a fully congested service, so the cost of reducing the variance of 4 properties equals 4 times the cost of that 
reduction for one property. 
19. Note that for a given price or tax, the reduction in the range of assessed values in scenarios B and C are the 
same. Thus, there is no difference in the effciency of the government and the private frm in providing infor
mation. 
10. Our experiment is similar to a multiple price list as in Holt and Laury (2002), but in this case subjects pay to 
-
make a selection further down the list, and the framing is quite different. 
11. While the order of parameters was random, once randomized, it was fxed across subjects so each subject faces 
the exact same sequence of choices. This was done to ensure comparability across subjects without concern 
that the order of the presentation of parameter sets would be a source of variation. 
12. This allows us to conduct both within-subject tests of treatment effects (among those subjects who faced both 
of two particular scenarios) as well as across-subject tests of treatment effects. 
13. The random-rematching protocol is designed to prevent social infuence from directly spilling over to future de-
cisions in Scenario D (e. g., there is no incentive for direct conditional cooperation or reciprocity). This allows 
us to treat individual subjects as the unit of analysis. In Scenarios A, B, and C, subjects face individual choice 
decisions, and so the random rematching should in principle have no effect. The protocol is maintained across 
all four scenarios to maintain the framing of “a house in a neighborhood” and to prevent the rematching from 
being a potential confounding infuence. 
14. Sample sizes provide suffcient power to test our main hypotheses. For the Mann-Whitney tests reported below, 
the required sample size to fnd an effect size of d=0.5 (medium effect) with power 0.8 is combined n=106 
(our sample size is 135). For the matched-pair Wilcoxon tests reported, the required sample size is n=35, our 
sample size for our main tests. For the other two Wilcoxon tests, where n=15, the power is suffcient to detect 
a large difference (d=0.8). For remaining tests, the power is suffcient at any meaningful effect size. 
 













15. Subjects completed a questionnaire covering basic demographics and attitude toward government and taxes 
–these responses showed no correlation with decision-making behavior in our experiment and so we do not 
report any results from the questionnaire. 
16. There is one outlier in Scenario C, noted by the diamond in Figure 2. The results do not change with the exclu-
sion of this subject. 
17. This is one indication that subject behavior does not apparently change over time within the experiment. In 
addition, including period number as a regressor yields insignifcant results across all tested specifcations. It 
does not appear that subject learning affects the results reported here. This is contrary to the fndings of Blaufus 
and Möhlmann (2014) that subjects exhibited tax aversion at frst, which subsequently disappeared. 
18. Note that this can only apply to the across-subjects tests, as the within-subjects test require repeated measure-
ments. 
19. In models not presented here we also considered random-effects error specifcations as well as RE tobit models 
(to account for censoring) analogous to both those presented here. In all cases, results are qualitatively identical 
and quantitatively very close to those reported. We report the FE results for their ease of interpretation. We do 
not present any results on effects of demographic variables, as these did not reveal anything of interest, and are 
time-invariant and fall out with the fxed effect. 
20. In specifcations not shown, we included interactions as well as the period/round, but these were never statisti-
cally signifcant. 
21. We also considered log-linear, linear-log, and log-log specifcations of the estimated demand curve here. All 
are similar in terms of ft, and a linear estimate has advantages of simplicity of assumptions and ease of inter-
pretation. 
22. The COD is a standard descriptive measure of the quality of the assessment process (Gerau and Plourde, 1976).
The larger the COD, the larger the distribution of assessed values are around the median. 
23. Choices have to be made here about the minimum and maximum values of the ρ for corner decisions of no 
and full risk reduction. The results here use 0 as the minimum value and 18 as the maximum value (18 is the 
maximum value internal to the choices under the specifed parameter sets, and so it is the lowest value that 
would imply always choosing full investment in every decision). A straightforward robustness test is to exclude 
any subject’s choices in parameter sets where a choice of 0 or 10 (no or full investment) was selected. Doing 
so reinforces the results reported here. 
24. We tested for correlations between ρ and many of the demographics from the questionnaire and interestingly 
found the correlations are largely zero. 
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Llevamos a cabo un experimento de laboratorio que permite explorar la disposición al pago de los in-
dividuos. El objetivo es mejorar la precisión de las valoraciones de las propiedades inmobiliarias y 
analizar su relación con el pago impositivo. Exploramos si la disposición individual al pago puede 
mejorar la exactitud de las valoraciones de los activos inmobiliarios; en la medida en que disminuya el 
riesgo para otros propietarios la disposición al pago puede mejorar la exactitud de las valoraciones de 
los activos inmobiliarios; por último, utilizamos los resultados para estimar la demanda de reducción 
del riesgo. Los resultados indican que los sujetos pasivos no están dispuestos a pagar para reducir la 
variación en las valoraciones a un nivel compatible con las mejores prácticas de valoración de los im-
puestos sobre la propiedad. 
Palabras clave: valoraciones en el impuesto sobre la propiedad, experimento. 
Clasifcación JEL: H7, C91. 
